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I. INTRODUCTION

The International Criminal Court (ICC) will soon be the dominant
international forum adjudicating allegations of international crimes, as
those currently in operation are projected to complete their mandates in the
next few years. Because the Court is at an early stage of development, the
substantial body of case law developed at the ad hoc tribunals will remain
significant reference points; the International Criminal Tribunals for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and International Criminal Tribunals for
Rwanda (ICTR) will be particularly important. Notably, the ICC has only
begun to interpret their codes regarding sexual violence, and in doing so,
the Court has already relied upon the findings of the ad hoc tribunals.'
There will be many further opportunities to do so, with at least five of the
twelve warrants of arrest issued since July 2010 including counts of rape.2
*
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College, 2010; Visiting Student in Law, Wadham College, Oxford, 2009-2010. 1 owe thanks to
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I.
See Situation in Darfur, the Sudan, Case No. ICC-02/05-56, Prosecutor's Application
under Article 58(7),
23, 28, 119, 371, 385 & 393 (Feb. 27, 2007). For a discussion of the limited
extent to which the ICC has actually begun to interpret their code as relates to sexual violence, see K.
Alexa Koenig, et al., The Jurisprudenceof Sexual Violence (Human Rights Ctr. of UC Berkeley, Sexual
Violence & Accountability, Working Paper, May 2011).
2.
Prosecutor v. Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Second Warrant of Arrest (July 12,
2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc907140.pdf; Prosecutor v. Hussein, Case No. ICC-02/0501/12, Warrant of Arrest (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/docl 344965.pdf; Prosecutor
v. Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/12, Warrant of Arrest (Feb. 12, 2012), http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc 1344439.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2013).
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It is therefore important to take stock of the ad hoc tribunal's findings on
sexual violence.
A voluminous and dynamic debate has developed in academia and the
international judiciary around how the international criminal law regime
ought to define rape. Conflicts over competing definitions have found clear
expression in international scholarship and within the chambers of the ad
hoc tribunals and, more lately, the Pre-Trial Chambers of the ICC. These
decisions are all the more impactful because of the influence each judgment
affects throughout the international criminal law regime. This paper will
define in clear terms the two prevailing definitions of rape in the Tribunals,
and will put forward an explanation, using a procedural illustration to bring
the point home, as to why the courts have come to conclusions at variance
with one another. Finally, I will address the implications of the previous
argument upon the prospect of overlapping charges. In doing so, I will
suggest what might occur should a defendant be accused of sexual violence
as a crime of genocide and as a crime against humanity.
The debate has essentially centered on what I shall call consentdominant and coercion-dominant definitions of rape. The former, which
has arguably come to characterize the prevailing trend in the law, is most
succinctly articulated in the famous case, Kunarac, handed down by the
ICTY in 2001. I am excited that counsel for the prosecutor in that case,
Peggy Kuo, is with us this afternoon. The coercion-dominant definition,
touted by Catherine MacKinnon as "the first time rape was defined in law
as what it is in life,"3 was first articulated in the equally famous but less
influential case Akayesu, delivered by the ICTR in 1998.
II. PROSECUTOR V. AKAYESU

Jean-Paul Akayesu, an ethnic Hutu, was a municipal administrator in
the Taba Commune in central Rwanda during the Rwandan Genocide. He
was arrested in 1995 on charges, inter alia, of genocide and crimes against
humanity. Akayesu was found to have instigated a number of incidents of
rape as part of a larger effort to eradicate the Tutsi, with the Trial Chamber
determining that the act fell within the ambit of the genocide provision in
the Tribunal's statute.4 For the first time, rape was considered a weapon of
genocide.
3.

Catherine MacKinnon, Defining Rape Internationally, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 940,

944(2006).
4.

Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment,

731 (Sept. 2, 1998):

With regard, particularly, to the acts described in paragraphs 12(A) and 12(B) of
the Indictment, that is, rape and sexual violence, the Chamber wishes to
underscore the fact that in its opinion, they constitute genocide in the same way as
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The Akayesu decision was considered revolutionary because it
abandoned "mechanical" descriptions of rape, which generally required a
certain degree of penetration and, most critically, a particular state of mind
on the part of the victim (that is, of non-consent). Rather, the Trial
Chamber held, rape is better determined as "physical invasion of a sexual
nature, committed under circumstances that are coercive." 5 In putting the
elemental emphasis on force, and, furthermore, the force of the
circumstances, the Trial Chamber made a strong case for abandoning
consent entirely:
Any consent the defense could claim would be
invalidated by the genocidal violence attending the act. Prior to Akayesu,
charges of rape had not figured into the prosecution of charges of
genocide, 6 but after the judgment was handed down this changed
considerably. These new charges were in turn often used as chips in plea
bargaining agreements.7 While Akayesu remained influential at the ICTR, a
case at the ICTY, Kunarac, would change the way both ad hoc tribunals
approached the question.

III. PROSECUTOR V. KUNARAC
The three defendants in Kunarac were ethnic Serbs charged with rape,
torture, enslavement, and outrages upon personal dignity, all related to their
participation in a campaign to cleanse Muslims from a municipality then
any other act as long as they were committed with the specific intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a particular group, targeted as such... [s]exual violence was an
integral part of the process of destruction, specifically targeting Tutsi women and
specifically contributing to their destruction and to the destruction of the Tutsi
group as a whole.
5.
Id.at 597, 687 (noting that consent is only mentioned when noting that a word the
victims used to describe the rapes, "kunurgora," is "used regardless of whether the woman is married or
not, and regardless of whether she gives consent or not.").
6.
Rhonda Copelon, Gender Crimes as War Crimes: Integrating Crimes Against Women
into InternationalCriminalLaw, 47 McGILL L.J. 217, 236. Cf. Binaifer Nowrojee, Your Justice is Too
Slow: Will the ICTR Fail Rwanda's Rape Victims?, Occasional Paper No. 10, UNRISD, at 3:
The ICTR is feted by lawyers for its first landmark judgment in the case of
Akayesu that expanded international law on rape-a point of pride that the ICTR
officials always cite as a manifestation of their commitment of prosecute sexual
violence. Yet as ground-breaking as the Akayesu judgment is, it increasingly
stands as an exception, an anomaly (citations omitted).
This may well be true considering the influence of the Kunarac decision discussed below. But it
remains true that Akayesu opened the door to the broader use of rape charges in indictments at the ICTR;
it is questionable whether the judgments handed down thereafter followed in Akayesu's spirit,
however.).
7.
(2009).

See Doris E. Buss, Rethinking "Rape as a Weapon of War, " 17 FEM. LEG. STuD. 145, 151
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known as Fo~a. As Judge Florence Mumba noted in the sentencing
hearing, "even the town's name was cleansed," referred to now as Srbinje.
Serbs rounded up Muslims in Fo(a, killing most of the men on the spot and
sending most of the women to collection points outside of the municipality.
Kunarac, Kova6, and Vukovi6 were found guilty of employing rape as an
instrument of terror at these collection points, and that the instances of rape
were systemically related to the overarching purpose of the Serbian
8
presence in Fo~a, making them crimes against humanity.
The judgment represents a milestone at the ICTY: Until that point no
convictions of rape were ever rendered at the Tribunal. However, the
definition of rape established at the court was controversial for manifestly
ignoring the precedent offered by Akayesu. Rather than defining rape
according to something akin to a strict liability standard (that is, with
reference only to the circumstances of the crime rather than whether the
defendant thought the alleged victim consented) the Kunarac court
determined the definition of rape to turn on the question of consent
abandoned at the ICTR three years before.
Claiming that no workable definition of rape in international law
existed, the Trial Chamber sought a "lowest common denominator" element
upon which to base their own definition by reviewing a diverse array of
domestic criminal codes from around the world. 9 While a fairly standard
method of judicial interpretation, it carries an inherent danger in the context
of defining sexual violence, particularly at a war crimes tribunal.
Notwithstanding the meaningful differences in rape definitions across
jurisdictions (civil law historically carrying a broader definition of what
types of penetration may constitute rape than common law, for example), 0
these domestic laws were formulated for adjudicating crimes in times of
peace. It can, of course, be argued that the conditions established in the
Serb detention camp have potential to be created in a jurisdiction not beset
with conflict. A man might kidnap, unjustly detain, and rape several
women in any jurisdiction. This was, perhaps, the logic the Trial Chamber
followed in Kunarac. But as Judge Chile Eboe-Osuji, recently elected to a
judgeship at the ICC, and Professor Anne-Marie de Brouwer have argued,
the intended purpose of domestic rape law cannot be said to adequately
match the intended purpose of international rape law, the latter of which

8.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kunarac, et al., Case No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/I-T, Judgment,
759 (Feb. 22, 2001).
9.

Id. at 439 passim.

10.

MARIA ERIKSSON, DEFINING

INTERNATIONAL LAW? 129 (2010).

RAPE:

EMERGING OBLIGATIONS FOR STATES UNDER
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generally deals with broad-conflict situations." In these cases, rape would
not have reasonably occurred but for the conflict, which adds, to my mind,
sufficient justification to privilege "contexts of force" over "non-consent."
The trial judgment was upheld on appeal, with the Appeals Chamber
agreeing with my central proposition above. It noted that, while "inferring"
non-consent from surrounding violent circumstances must be done with
care, it is hardly unreasonable in light of rape during times of war.' 2 The
Appeals Chamber elaborated on the definition of rape as a war crime and
emphasized that in order to be classified, it must be established that "but
for" the armed conflict, the rape would not have been committed. 3 This
might be read as a criticism of the Trial Chamber's use of domestic law as
the source of their definition of rape, but it is important to remember that it
is the Trial Chamber's formula that has been subsequently discussed in the
literature and utilized as precedent in the courts. Notwithstanding the
criticism from above, the Trial Chamber's formula has endured, perhaps as
a consequence of a misreading of the Appeals Chamber's binding
judgment.
IV. RECONCILING

AKA YESU AND KUNARAC

Over the years, scholars of international criminal law have used
Akayesu and Kunarac to legitimize coercion-dominant and consentdominant definitions of rape respectively. The two have been set up against
each other in efforts to demonstrate one's superiority. 14 It is largely
overlooked, however, that each adjudicated different overarching crimes:
In Kunarac, rape fell under the rubric of crimes against humanity; in
Akayesu, rape ultimately fell under the rubric of genocide.' 5 This
distinction may elucidate how the respective Trial Chambers decided on
definitions of rape at variance with one another. They essentially defined
subtly different crimes. Because the evidentiary standards for crimes
against humanity are less strict than those for genocide, insofar as a charge

II.

ANNE-MARIE DE BROUWER, SUPRANATIONAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF SEXUAL

VIOLENCE: THE ICC AND THE PRACTICE OF THE ICTY AND THE ICTR, 116 (2005); Chile Eboe-Osuji,
Rape as Genocide: Some QuestionsArising, 9 J. GENOCIDE RES. 251,258 (2007).

12.

Prosecutor v. Kunarac, et al., Case No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/I-A, Appeal Judgment,

218 (June 12, 2002).

13.

Id. at 58.

14.

E.g., Eboe-Osuji, supranote 11, at 251.

15.
See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-I, Amended Indictment, Counts 13, 15
(Jan. 1, 1996) (noting that because prosecutors could only charge the accused with rape via crimes
against humanity, Akayesu's indictment only named rape as a crime against humanity. The Trial
Chamber nevertheless found rape to be a crime of genocide for the purposes of the case.).
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of genocide can only succeed with proof of the requisite genocidal mens
rea,16 perhaps the respective Chambers came to conclusions they thought
best calibrated to the overarching crime at bar.
Akayesu himself conceded immediately that genocide occurred in
Rwanda in 1994. While the debate over whether genocide occurred in the
Balkan conflict of the 1990s continues to this day, the courts in The Hague
(the ICTY, the International Court of Justice in Bosnia v. Serbia) have
consistently found that genocide did not occur. 17 It may be erroneous,
therefore, to impose the evidentiary standard of Akayesu on Kunarac as
Judge Eboe-Osuji and many others consistently do. Eboe-Osuji wrote in
1997:
[T]he very nature of the circumstances in which rape occurs in
the context of genocide makes inquiry into consent almost
wholly out of place. Rape as an act of genocide is predicated on
the special intent to destroy a group in whole or in part, the
victim of rape being part of the group targeted for such
destruction .... In these circumstances, it is curious to import
into the inquiry tenets of domestic law that were originally
designed to ensure that a complainant had not merely changed
her mind after the fact of a consensual "sexual activity .... "
This is the major flaw in Kunarac, given its heavy reliance on
domestic law.
As this passage indicates, part of the impetus to emphasize coercion
over consent relies on the context of the crime in genocide; yet nothing in
the Trial Chamber's deliberations over Kunarac indicated that genocide
was a circumstance attending the crime, qualifying the crime, or motivating
the defendants' behavior. While this is not the time to elaborate on the
difference between genocide and the crimes against humanity (for which
Kunarac was in fact charged), the fact that the Kunarac trial chamber was
dealing with a different over-arching crime should indicate that perhaps a
different mens rea, one less inclined toward strict liability perhaps, would
have been more appropriate.
None of this amounts to anything if
"genocide" and "crimes against humanity" are blended together; some
16. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, arts. 6-7, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/9 (1998) (noting that the ICC Statute offers prevailing definitions of the two crimes)
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
17. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007. Cf Prosecutor v.
Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, INJ1-38 (Feb. 22, 2001) (affirming Trial Chamber's finding
that genocide occurred in Srebrenica).
18.

E.g., Eboe-Osuji, supra note 11, at 258.
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scholars have been willing to take this step for purposes of defining rape.' 9
Perhaps they should not be, as the requirements of proof for the mens rea of
genocide and crimes against humanity are substantially different.
Again, notwithstanding the Chamber's long proof of the fact in their
opinion,20 genocide was a foregone conclusion in Akayesu; the defendant
never denied the existence of genocide. Once this threshold question was
affirmatively answered, requiring the demanding proof of specific intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a protected group, it is my opinion that the
Chamber then defined rape in a broad manner that lowered the evidentiary
standards for the prosecution. 2 ' Kunarac,on the other hand, never alleged
genocidal intent and the standard of proof is much lower. Rather than
specific intent, crimes against humanity requires proof of knowledge that a
protected group will be compromised as a result of their acts.22 The
Kunarac Chamber seems to respond to this lower threshold of proof by
raising the evidentiary standard for rape by requiring "explicit and
affirmative inquiry into the consent of the victim. ' 23 Under the Akayesu
regime, it seems that because the demanding mens rea requirement of
genocide has already been met, the definition of rape may tend more toward
a strict liability standard, holding any genocidaire who has sexually
engaged a protected group member under conditions of genocide criminally
liable for rape due to the overarching presence of coercion. Sex with a
genocidaire under conditions of genocide, Akayesu affirms, cannot be
consented to, so non-consent is not an element of the crime. Under
Kunarac, with crimes against humanity serving as the template upon which
the judgment shall read its definition of rape, courts will tend to enforce the
non-consent requirement, as the culpability of the accused has not already
been determined to be the highest possible. Sex with someone accused of
crimes against humanity, Kunarac seems to say, may not be unequivocally
a weapon of the crime and the Court must look toward other standards of
culpability, such as non-consent.
V. IN CAMERA HEARINGS

Discussing in camera hearings, a procedural device meant to assess
the appropriateness of consent defenses in criminal trials involving rape at

19.

Wolfgang Schomburg & Ines Peterson, Genuine Consent to Sexual Violence Under

InternationalLaw, 101 AMER. J. INT'L L. 121,123-24 (2007).

20.

Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-, Amended Indictment,

21.

Rome Statute, supranote 16, art. 6.

22.

Id art 7(b).

23.

Koenig, supra note 1,at 12.

112-29.

258

ILSA Journalof International& ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 19:2

the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC, may help to clarify the points I made so
far. In camera hearings allow the defendant to provide private testimony to
be held in the judges' chambers so as to alleviate pressure on alleged
victims of sexual violence during litigation. While not a novel practice in
American criminal law, in camera hearings were introduced to the ICTY's
amended Rules of Procedure and Evidence in 1995. The rule sought to
protect the rights of victims and witnesses by having the accused introduce
any consent-related defenses in a private hearing before the judges in their
chambers. If the judges determine the defense to be untenable, the defense
cannot be admitted in trial. If it is deemed tenable, the defendant may bring
it forward as an affirmative defense.24 The ICC inherited this procedural
safeguard in Rule 72 of its Rules of Procedure and Evidence. While it
seems well intended on its face, a proponent of a coercion-dominant
definition of rape might raise concerns that it reflects a potential lack of
confidence in a strong, violence-based definition. For those who tend
toward favoring a consent-dominant definition of rape, the procedure might
appear as a premature determination on the merits, which may prejudice the
defendant's case. 5
The debate I described a moment ago as to whether allegations of rape
should be treated the same if there were no question of fact as to the
overarching presence of genocide on the one hand, or crimes against
humanity on the other may shed some light on this. Let us suppose that the
fact of genocide is unquestioned before the court (as in Akayesu). Nonconsent might be abandoned entirely as a possible defense. If the fact of
genocide is in question, in camera hearings become more appropriate, with
24. R. P. EVID. for the former Yugoslavia, Rule 96(ii)(a-b) (amended May 3, 1995); R. P.
EviD. for the former Yugoslavia, Rule 96(iii) (revised Jan. 3, 1995). They read as follows, and are
repeated verbatim in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the ICTR:
(ii)

consent shall not be allowed as a defence if the victim

has been subjected to or threatened with or has had reason to fear
(a)
violence, duress, detention or psychological oppression, or
reasonably believed that if the victim ['she' in previous versions]
(b)
did not submit, another might be so subjected, threatened or put in fear;
(iii) before evidence of the victim's consent is admitted, the accused shall
satisfy the Trial Chamber in camera that the evidence is relevant and credible.
The language change in (ii)(b) may have been in anticipation of the Tadic indictment, which included
charges of sexual assault against a male. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on Defense
Motion on Form of the Indictment (Nov. 14, 1995).
25. See, e.g., Kelly Dawn Askin, Sexual Violence in Decisions and Indictments of the
Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribunals: Current Status, 93 AMER. J. OF INT'L L. 97, 104 (1999); DE
BROUWER, supra note 11, at 121 (seeming to suggest the in camera rule may rule out consent). For
more background on the origins of the rule at the ICTY, see MacKinnon, supranote 3, at 945.
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non-consent acting as an affirmative defense granted by the judge by
shifting the burden of proof onto the defendant. And finally, if the fact of
genocide is not even brought to bar, consent may become an element of the
crime of rape (as in domestic jurisdictions) and the burden shifts back to the
prosecution to prove non-consent beyond a reasonable doubt.
This does not answer the question as to what should constitute consent
or non-consent in the context of ethnic cleansing, but it does go some way
to explain the trend in the case law. The Akayesu and Kunarac courts seem
to be pointing two different crimes: Rape as a weapon of genocide and rape
as a crime against humanity. The debates over Akayesu and Kunarac and
their progeny may not have taken sufficiently into consideration this factor.
The courts seem to have caught hold of this and calibrated their judgments
according to the situation in which the crime was committed. Professors
MacKinnon and de Brouwer and Judge Eboe-Osuji demand from these
opinions a settled, singular definition of rape, but the courts seem to want to
define rape along a spectrum, with the type of over-arching crime as a
26
reference point.
Looking at it this way also helps to explain the discomfort many of the
commentators on the subject felt when the ICTR, a tribunal dealing almost
exclusively with genocide claims, handed down several decisions that
utilized Kunarac's requirement of non-consent as an element of the crime
of rape. For example, Semanza and Kajelpeli,27 two cases heard at the
ICTR, applied the Kunarac standard, though, in Professor MacKinnon's
words, "there was no implication that the women who were sexually
violated before they were murdered might have consented., 28 If the
standards seem appropriate to their particular contexts, applying them
elsewhere is not always sensible. In fact, it may indicate that the situations
in which they are applied are elementally different, by virtue of the variable
mens rea (though not necessarily variable results) and that29the definitions
themselves must accommodate to the situations accordingly.

26. See MacKinnon, supra note 3, at 940; DE BROUWER, supra note 11, at 116; Eboe-Osuji,
supra note 11, at 251.
27.
Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgment,
344 (May 15, 2003);
Prosectuor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T, Judgment 911 (Dec. 1, 2003).
28.

MacKinnon, supra note 3, at 952.

29.
The mens rea, again, being the chief distinguishing factor between genocide and the crime
against humanity of ethnic cleansing. The result elements of the crimes-potentially the targeting and
elimination of members of a protected group-may be the same.
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VI. OVERLAPPING CHARGES

If it may be accepted that judges at the ICTR and the ICTY have
sought to calibrate the definition of rape according to the predicate crime of
which it is a part, it becomes unclear whether a judge would privilege one
over the other if the defendant before her has been accused of both rape as a
weapon of genocide and as a crime against humanity. At the ICTR this has
actually been common practice. Rape has appeared on indictments as an
act of genocide and as a crime against humanity repeatedly since Akayesu
was handed down. 30 The problem this presents with regard to the thesis put
forward here is why should the definition of rape be different according to
whether it is alleged to have been part of a genocide or as a crime against
humanity, since the actus reus remains the same regardless? That is, rape
will consist of the same physical act whether it is a function of genocide,
crimes against humanity, or war crimes. It may therefore be unclear why
the variant mens rea would demand a different evidentiary standard for an
identical act.
We have a glimpse how this may operate, however, in a case we have
already discussed: Akayesu was indicted on charges of rape as a crime
against humanity and on charges of genocide.31 The Trial Chamber found
him guilty of both, but determined the acts of rape fell also under the charge
of genocide, and in doing so applied the standard discussed above. The
Trial Chamber discussed the problem that arose from concurrent charges,
based on the same set of facts, as follows.
The question which arises at this stage is whether, if the Chamber is
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that a given factual allegation set out
in the indictment has been established, it may find the accused guilty of all
of the crimes charged in relation to those facts or only one. The reason for
posing this question is that it might be argued that the accumulation of
criminal charges offends against the principle of double jeopardy or a
substantive non bis in idem principle in criminal law. Thus, an accused
who is found guilty of both genocide and crimes against humanity in
relation to the same set of facts may argue that he has been twice judged for
the same offence, which is generally considered impermissible in criminal
law. 32
The Chamber went on to explain that it was permissible to find the
accused guilty of overlapping charges over the same acts, provided each
charge consisted of a crime possessing different elements. Concluding that
30.

See Buss, supra note 7, at 151; see also Nowrojee, supra note 6, at 3.

31.

Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-1, Amended Indictment, counts 1, 13.

32. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, 462. The Trial Chamber relies on Tadic,
Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on Defense Motion on Form of the Indictment.
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the offences under its statute "have different elements and, moreover, are
intended to protect different interests," the Chamber found that "multiple
convictions for these offences in relation to the same set of facts is
permissible. 33 The Akayesu Chamber indicates that irrespective of the
underlying factual allegations, genocide and crimes against humanity are
fundamentally different crimes, neither of which are subsumed into the
other or considered, for purposes of the Statute, greater or lesser than the
other.34 Rape, it would follow, as an expression of these crimes, may carry
with it differing elements according to the overarching crime.
The ICC's Pre-Trial Chamber encountered a version of this problem in
rendering its initial negative determination regarding the prosecutor's
application for a warrant of arrest for President al-Bashir of Sudan. The
prosecutor sought charges of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes, using the same underlying allegations of widespread rape to support
all three. The Chamber rejected the prosecutor's "reliance on the nature
and extent of the war crimes and crimes against humanity allegedly
committed by [the Government of Sudan] forces as evidence of [the
Government's] genocidal intent. 3 5 The prosecutor was, however, using the
same factual background to allege the commission of a separate crime
unrelated, as an elemental matter, to the other crimes. Kelly Askin has
suggested that widespread rape may in itself serve as evidence of genocidal
intent, 36 and ultimately the Appeals Chamber agreed, remanding the
prosecutor's application.3 7 From this it can be ascertained that, just as
crimes against humanity and genocide are discretely different crimes, rape
may carry different definitions calibrated to the greater crime of which it is
a part. The facts regarding an incident of rape underlying a charge of
genocide or crimes against humanity will be the same, of course. Rape is
alleged either way. But the contextual elements and varying mental state
requirements of the crimes of genocide or crimes against humanity may
militate in favor of approaching the underlying facts with different mens
rea requiements.
33.

Id. at TI 469-70.

34.

Id; see also PAYAM AKHAVAN, REDUCING GENOCIDE TO LAW: DEFINITION, MEANING,

AND THE ULTIMATE CRIME (2012).

35.
Prosecutor v. Bashir, Case No. ICC 02/05-01/09, Decision on the Prosecution's
Application of Arrest, §§ 190-201 (Mar. 4, 2009); see also Situation in Darfur, The Sudan, Case No.
ICC 02/05-157, Public Redacted Version of the Prosecutor's Application under Article 58, §§ 76-209
(July 14, 2008).

36. Kelly Dawn Askin, Holding Leaders Accountable in the International Criminal Court
(ICC)for Gender Crimes Committed in Darfur, I GENOCIDE STUD. & PREVENTION 13, 20 (2006).
37.
Arrest.

See Bashir, Case No. ICC 02/05-01/09, Decision on the Prosecution's Application of
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As the above suggests, concurrent charges of rape as an act of
genocide and rape as a crime against humanity may pose procedural
difficulties. What should be done if evidence of consent is considered
unilaterally irrelevant for purposes of the genocide charge, but not for the
crime against humanity charge, as Akayesu and Kunarac imply? The
answer would seem to lie in Akayesu and al-Bashir: If the fact of genocide
had been established ex ante, or if there is reason to believe there existed
the requisite mens rea of genocide in early investigation, few procedural
difficulties to this end will be encountered. With the Pre-Trial Chamber
having finally permitted the prosecutor's application to go through with a
genocide charge attached,38 the prosecutor's office will have the
opportunity to begin establishing through investigation whether genocide
occurred in the Sudan or not, the result of which will affect the manner of
the proceedings upon al-Bashir's arrest.
VII. CONCLUSION

The foregoing argument has sought to articulate a central tension in
the precedent established at the ad hoc tribunals with regard to the crime of
rape. The tension exists between coercion-dominant and consent-dominant
definitions of rape as articulated in the leading cases Akayesu and Kunarac
respectively. I have suggested that the definitions put forward in these
cases must be read in relation to the predicate crime of which rape was a
part: Genocide in the first and crimes against humanity in the second. I
have also argued that much of the scholarly literature on the subject may
have overlooked this distinction. I then explored two possible implications
of this interpretation through the use of in camera hearings and overlapping
charges. In spite of the voluminous commentary on the issue, it is clear that
the definition of rape is far from settled. In the years ahead, the Court will
have many opportunities to develop a more workable definition than the
ones currently available. With the fate of international criminal justice
essentially resting in their hands, it is their responsibility to do so.

Prosecutor v. Bashir, Case No. ICC 02/05-01/09, Second Warrant of Arrest (July 12,
38.
2010) (noting that the Pre-Trial Chamber affirmed the charges of genocide, though they were founded
upon the same factual background as the other charges).

